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Conway: Politics as Usual

TERRORISM, THE LAW AND POLITICS AS
USUAL: A COMPARISON OF ANTI-TERRORISM
LEGISLATION BEFORE AND AFTER 9/11
Mona Conway1
INTRODUCTION

Under the state sponsor of terrorism exception to the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),2 victims of terrorist
acts may bring suit against foreign countries in federal district
court to obtain compensatory and punitive damages. Prior to this
fairly recent legislation foreign states retained almost absolute
immunity from suit in United States courts.' With this
jurisdictional element now in place, American plaintiffs can
initiate lawsuits against foreign countries so long as they allege
that the defendant foreign state is a "state sponsor of terrorism" (as
defined in the statute), and that such support caused the injuries to
be redressed. 4 The most challenging aspect of the process is
collecting a judgment. It is for this reason that the FSIA, in its
current form, has come under harsh criticism. Congress enacted the
exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity for the express purposes
of compensating victims and their families and deterring future
acts of terrorism. However, despite numerous amendments enacted
to facilitate claims against terrorist nations, the executive branch of
our government has maintained protection of foreign state assets.
Thus, it has become virtually impossible for plaintiffs to collect the
judgments they fought so hard to win.
The FSIA has both legal and political ramifications. While
the Anti-Terrorism legislation empowered U.S. courts to hear and
redress claims brought by Americans against foreign governments,
it simultaneously allowed the executive branch to block the
' J.D. Candidate 2003, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center.
2

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat.

2891 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 - 1611 (2000 & Nov. 28, 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-77, Title VI, § 626(c), 115 Stat. 803; Jan. 10, 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-117, Div B, Ch. 2, § 208, 115 Stat. 2299, Nov. 26, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-

297, Title II, § 201(c)(3), 116 Stat. 2337)).

3 See infra text accompanying notes 6-13.
4 See discussion infra Part I.A.
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execution of judgments won by these plaintiffs. Therefore, the
Act's very purpose can be overridden by the executive branch,
effectively precluding any relief for the people it intended to be
compensated. Consequently, vindication for plaintiffs who have
successfilly sued under the FSIA has been confined to theoretical
notions ofjustice. This is so because no plaintiff has yet collected a
tangible award from any defendant foreign state.
During the Clinton Administration, the legal hurdles faced
by plaintiffs suing under the FSIA were dwarfed by the political
obstacles they confronted. As such, this note will consider the
potential fate of this legal remedy since the infamous terrorist
attacks on U.S. citizens on September 11, 2001 (9/11). Prior to
9/11, the American public was largely detached from the
devastating effects of terrorist attacks on our citizenry. Since
terrorism has now hit home, the nation's outrage is palpable.
Whereas the notion of terrorism took on a rudimentary meaning at
the time President Clinton was in the White House, the term now
embodies the nature of "evil" in a Bush-led 5 America. At this point
in our country's history, it seems inconceivable that the U.S.
government's opposition to suits brought by the victims of the
World Trade Center massacre would be considered acceptable by
the American public. Yet, there has been no public outcry
condemning the United States' perfect record of successful
opposition to such claims. Despite recent events and a change in
administration the remedial landscape of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act may continue to take on new forms, but ultimately,
it will leave victims of terrorism with a right, but no remedy. In
this context, the adage "politics as usual" takes on a most
disheartening connotation.
BACKGROUND

In the United States, the doctrine of sovereign immunity
has long been recognized as sacrosanct.6 The "act of state"
5 All references made herein to President Bush refer to George W. Bush.

6 See generally The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136
(1812) (stating that a strict theory of sovereign immunity implies that foreign
nations enjoy absolute immunity from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts and that our
nation's immunity is reciprocally honored).
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doctrine, for example, has been employed by the judiciary to avoid
embarrassing the other branches of government by the courts'
usurping the constitutional duty of the executive and legislative
branches to decide issues of foreign concern. 7 By the middle of

the twentieth century American jurisprudence recognized the need
to shift from absolute immunity accorded to foreign states in U.S.
courts toward a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. This
trend was born out of the rise of Communism and increased

foreign trading. 9 Yet, it was not until 1976 that this restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity was codified in the. Foreign

Sovereign Immunities Act. Until that time, foreign states enjoyed
virtually unrestricted and absolute0 immunity from suits in U.S.
courts as a matter of common law.'
Prior to the passage of the FSIA, international conflicts
were strictly a matter of diplomatic relations and the U.S. State
Department had the final say with respect to immunity." It was
clear that private citizens could not be guaranteed a legal remedy
7 See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682

(1976). The act of state doctrine has been described in the following manner:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another
done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason
of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be
availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.
Id. at 691(quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)). In the
FSIA case of Dalibertiv. Republic ofIraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 55 (D.D.C. 2000),
the "act of state" doctrine was considered a judicial interference with foreign
policy.
8 See Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 698. A legal separation of foreign activities
has been recognized by the courts since 1952, whereby public acts of a
sovereign should remain judicially unchallenged but commercial and private
acts should create an exception to sovereign immunity. Id.; see also S. Jason
Baletsa, Comment: The Cost of Closure: A Reexamination of the Theory and
Practiceof the 1996 Amendments to the ForeignSovereign Immunities Act, 148
U. PA. L. REv. 1247, 1254 (2000) (stating that the concern that a more global
economy would increase the legal problems faced domestically was a key
reason for necessitating foreign accountability).
9 See Flatow v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 18 (D.D.C.
1998).
10
See id. at 11.
" See id.
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when disputes arose involving foreign sovereigns.1 2 Therefore, the
FSIA was enacted to provide a jurisdictional basis for claims by
Consequently,
Americans against foreign sovereigns.1 3
determinations of sovereign immunity were relinquished by the
executive branch and empowered in the judiciary.14 The idea was
to allow certain legal disputes to be decided based on legal
standards and not on political temperaments.1 5 The FSIA must be
applied in every private action involving a foreign state defendant
within the United States.1 6 The Act left intact the protective shield
of immunity by virtue of a statutory presumption,17 but removed
from protection those acts which fell within certain enumerated
exceptions. 18

'2 See Baletsa, supra note 8, at 1257.
1328 U.S.C. § 1602 provides:
The Congress finds that the determination by United States
courts of the claims of foreign states to immunity from the
jurisdiction of such courts would serve the interests of justice
and would protect the rights of both foreign states and litigants
in United States courts. Under international law, states are not
immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their
commercial activities are concerned, and their commercial
property may be levied upon for the satisfaction of judgments
rendered against them in connection with their commercial
activities. Claims of foreign states to immunity should
henceforth be decided by courts of the United States and of the
States in conformity with the principles set forth in this
chapter....
14 See Flatow,999 F. Supp. at 19.
1s See National Airmotive Corp. v. Government & State of Iran. 499 F. Supp.
401,406 (D.D.C. 1980); see also Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 11.
16 The FSIA is the "exclusive source of subject matter jurisdiction
over all civil
of
Iran, 76 F.
states."
Flatow
v.
The
Islamic
Republic
actions against foreign
Supp. 2d 16, 20 (D.D.C. 1999) (citing Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess
ShTping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434-35 (1989)).
'See Hwang v. Japan, 172 F. Supp. 2d 52, 56 (D.D.C. 2001) (the FSIA
dictates that foreign states are presumptively immune from lawsuits brought in
the U.S.).
The original exceptions to the FSIA included
'8 28 U.S.C. §1602(a)(1-5).
voluntary waivers of immunity, commercial activity in the U.S. and noncommercial torts committed within the scope of employment.
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Then came the problem of terrorism'9 against U.S. citizens,
which began to escalate over the latter part of the twentieth
century. In 1979, Iranian militants held hostage and tortured more
than fifty Americans over a period of 444 days. 20 In 1988, Pan Am
flight 103 was bombed in a terrorist attack over Lockerbie,
Scotland, claiming the lives of 259 Americans aboard. 21 A suicide
bomber bombed an Israeli tour bus in 1995, killing an American
student on board. 22 Less than one year later, several more
Americans were murdered in the terrorist bombing of another bus
in Israel.23 Also in 1996, three Americans were killed when the
Cuban government ordered a military strike on a civilian airplane
flying over international waters on a routine, humanitarian
mission. 24 Between 1980 and 1996 foreign terrorists killed more
than 600 Americans and injured many more.2 5 In direct response
to the growing pattern of terrorist attacks on U.S. citizens,
Congress enacted legislation to fight the so-called war on terror.26
In 1996, the FSIA was amended by the Anti-Terrorism and
19 Although

definitions of terrorism vary to some degree, one statute has
generally defined terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine
agents." Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 17 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 2656f (d) (2)).
20 See Roeder v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 195 F. Supp. 2d 140, 146
(D.D.C. 2002).
21 See In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie Scotland on December 21, 1988, 37 F.3d
804, 810 (2d Cir. 1994).
22 See Flatow v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16, 18 (D.D.C.
1999).
23 See Weinstein v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 184 F. Supp. 2d 13, 15-16
(D.D.C. 2002).
24 See Alejandre v. The Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1242 (S.D. Fla.
1997).
25 Sean P. Vitrano, Comment: Hell-Bent on Awarding Recovery to Terrorism
Victims: The Evolution and Application of the Antiterrorism Amendments to the
ForeignSovereign Immunities Act, 19 DICK. J. INT'L L. 213, 218 (2000).
26 See Flatow v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 11 (D.D.C.
1998) (discussing that the anti-terrorism amendment was part of a federal
initiative to combat international terrorism). The dismissal of Smith v. Socialist
People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 886 F. Supp. 306 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (which
concerned the bombing of flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland) for lack of
jurisdiction, the lobbying efforts by the Flatow family, and the Cuban attack on
American civilian pilots have all been considered catalysts for the amendments
to the FSIA. See Baletsa, supra note 8, at 1261; see also Vitrano, supra note 25,
at 218.
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This

sweeping legislation, enacted to hold terrorist nations accountable
and to create a civil remedy for victims of foreign terrorism, had a
two-fold effect: it removed sovereign immunity from state
sponsors of terrorism 29 and allowed for the attachment of property

and assets of foreign states within the United States to satisfy
judgments obtained by victims of terrorism.3 0 The Anti-terrorism
Act carved out the exception to foreign sovereign immunity for
two express purposes: (1) it was designed to influence the

sovereign conduct of foreign states in an effort to combat
terrorism, and (2) it provided the
substantive law of liability for
31
non-immune acts, i.e., terrorism.

However, certain obstacles to recovery for victims
remained 32 and a stronger message of absolute intolerance of
terrorism needed to be conveyed by the U.S. government. In
response, Congress further amended the FSIA by expanding the
scope of attachment of foreign property within the United States

27

Pub. L. No.' 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1241-43 (codified as amended at 28

U.S.C. §1605(a)(7) (2000 & Nov. 28, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-77, Title VI,
§ 626(c), 115 Stat. 803; Jan. 10, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117, Div 13, Ch. 2, § 208,
115 Stat. 2299, Nov. 26, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, Title II, § 201(c)(3), 116
Stat. 2337)).
28 Most references made to the FSIA and to all anti-terrorism amendments
made to the FSIA will be collectively referred to herein as the "Anti-Terrorism
Act."
29 This provision eliminated the limitation imposed in the original noncommercial tort exception of the FSIA requiring that the illegal conduct take
place within the U.S. See Baletsa, supra note 8, at 1261-62.
30 Prior to 1996, the FSIA imposed a strict in rem nexus requirement by
allowing plaintiffs to enforce judgments only against the property out of which
the claim arose. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1610(a)(2) (1994) (subsequently amended
1996, 1999, 2000, 2001). See Baletsa, supra note 8, at 1261-62.
31 See Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 14.
32 A major roadblock in the execution of judgments against state sponsors of
terrorism was the attachment requirement that the foreign-owned property be of
a commercial nature. See J. W. Dellapenna, Civil Remedies for International
Terrorism, 12 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 169, 282 (1999). Congress attempted to
remedy this by allowing a court to order execution of a judgment otherwise
protected by diplomatic immunity or frozen under the President's orders. Id. at
282-83.
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and allowing plaintiffs to recover punitive damages.33 This is
commonly known as the "Flatow Amendment," enacted with the

Flatow family's pending suit against Iran in mind.34 The Flatow
Amendment created a civil cause of action against a foreign state
and its agents for acts which, essentially, constitute a waiver of
sovereign immunity under the FSIA.35 Recognizing a potential
conflict of interest early on, Congress sought to remove the

political pressure inextricably involved in foreign matters and turn
determinations of accountability over to the judiciary. 36 Yet, what

Congress failed to foresee was the vehement resistance to
execution of judgments that the executive branch has relentlessly
exercised in precluding terrorist victims from their right to a
37

remedy.
In order to bring suit against a foreign sovereign under the

state sponsored terrorism exception, the foreign state must be a
designated sponsor of terrorism. 38 This is an official designation
determined by the U.S. Department of State. 39 To date, there are
33 Punitive damages have been held not recoverable against the foreign nation
itself but only against an agent or employee of the foreign state. See Flatow, 999
F. Supp at 12.
34 Id. (construing Civil Liability for Acts of State Sponsored Terrorism, 28
U.S.C. § 1605 note (1996)).
Both 1996 amendments are construed in
conjunction with one another. See Ungar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 211 F.
Supp. 2d 91, 93 (D.D.C. 2002).
3 See Roeder v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 195 F. Supp. 2d 140, 149
(D.D.C. 2002); Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 43 (D.D.C.
2000); Flatow v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16, 19 (D.D.C.
1999).
36 See Vitrano, supra, note 25, at 220-21.
31 Id. at 222.
38 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(7), providing an exception to a foreign
sovereign's immunity, there are three threshold requirements: (1) the plaintiff or
victim must be a U.S. national; (2) if the terrorist act took place within the
state's borders, the state must be given the opportunity to arbitrate the claim; and
(3) the foreign defendant must have been designated a state sponsor of terrorism
pursuant to either Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 or
Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Daliberti v. Republic of
Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 44 (D.D.C. 2000).
3 See Daliberti, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 44 ("The Export Administration Act calls
upon the Secretary of State to make a determination that a foreign state has
'repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism,' to notify the
relevant committees of both houses of Congress, and to publish the
determination in the Federal Register.").
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seven foreign sovereigns designated as state sponsors of terrorism:
Iran, Iraq, Cuba, Syria, Libya, Sudan, and North Korea.40 State
sponsorship is the term used to categorize the giving of material
support and resources to an individual or entity that commits
an
41
illegal act resulting in the death or injury of a U.S. citizen.
Former President Clinton publicly supported the new
legislation, expressing great sympathy for the families of the
42
victims of terrorism, whose spirit the legislation was honoring.
Yet the Clinton Administration had effectively sided with the
enemy, undermining the effectiveness of the new amendments by
successfully opposing enforcement of judgments obtained against
foreign state sponsors of terrorism. Although many plaintiffs have
won judgments, to date, there has not been a single plaintiff who
has successfully executed a judgment won in a suit under the
43
FSIA.
ANALYSIS

Part one of this comment will focus on the legal obstacles
to recovery encountered by plaintiffs after money damages have
been awarded under the Anti-terrorism Act.
Part two will examine the political conflicts which impede
the just process of recovery for victims of terrorism, yielding only
what is known as a "pyrrhic victory." It will explain why the U.S.
government has taken away with one hand what it gave with the
other.
Part three will compare the political climates of the Clinton
and Bush administrations in this context. It will examine the goals
intended by the Clinton Congress and discuss how the Bush
40 Terrorism List Government Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. 596.201
(2002).
44Flatow,999 F. Supp. at 12.
42 "We renew our fight against those who seek to terrorize us, in your names:
America will never surrender to terror." Vitrano, supra note 25, at 214 n.5
(quoting President Clinton on signing the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. Papers, Administration of William J. Clinton, 1996,
Book 1 (April 24, 1996)); see also Flatow, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 19 n.4.
43 See Hoffman and Stodola, Pursuing U.S. Civil Damagesfor Terrorism, THE
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Dec., 2001, at 12. But see infra notes 84, 103
and accompanying text.
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administration might pick up where the FSIA left off. The
executive branch's lack of assistance in facilitating plaintiffs'
recovery and its affirmative acts of intervention, precluding these
plaintiffs from executing their judgments, will be evaluated in a
post-September 1 1th political, social and legal world.
I. OBSTACLES TO JURISDICTION AND EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS

A.

The State Sponsor Problem

As a personal consideration, many plaintiffs contend that
the awards they pursue in suits against foreign state supporters of
terrorism are merely a secondary matter; for these plaintiffs,
confrontation and closure are what they truly seek.44 Yet, it is rare
for foreign defendants to answer complaints brought under the
Anti-terrorism Act;45 most foreign defendants simply ignore them
or refute them as being inappropriate in some manner.46
Consequently, plaintiffs are generally not afforded the opportunity
to confront their adversaries.
The first jurisdictional hurdle to be surmounted by
plaintiffs seeking justice under the FSIA is establishing that they
have been injured by a defendant nation whose name appears on
47
the State Department's short list of state sponsors of terrorism.
44 See, e.g., Pamela Falk, Families of Missing Have Three Options, N.Y.L.J.,
Nov. 27, 2001, at 5 (a "sense of justice" is what most families of the victims

desire).

45 The cases of Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 995 F.

Supp. 325 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) and Dalibertiv. Republic of Iraq are the only cases
in which the defendant state responded to the action. Daliberti,97 F. Supp. 2d
38, 44 (D.D.C. 2000). Defendant states Libya and Iraq responded, inter alia, by
filing motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, which both district courts denied.
46 Iran never defended itself, but spumed the Flatow suit, calling it "politically
motivated" and "totally lacking objectivity and credibility." Baletsa, supra note
8, at 1292 n.267 (quoting Jerseyan Seeks Top-Level Aid in Iran Suit, STARLEDGER (Newark, NJ), July 18, 1998, at 6, available at 1998 WL 3431042
(quoting an unnamed source from Tehran)). In Rein, Libya attempted to defend
itself by asserting its rights under international law and mistakenly asserted that
the U.S. court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. 995 F. Supp. at
328.
47
See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
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The mere fact that a foreign nation has not heretofore been
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism by the Department of
State may itself preclude a cause of action by a plaintiff injured by
that foreign state.4 A case in point is Saudi Arabia v. Nelson. 9
Scott Nelson, an American,
was arrested by the Saudi
Government and, during his thirty-nine day detainment, was
beaten, starved and tortured.5
Although Nelson's case was

dismissed prior to the enactment of the Anti-terrorism Act,52 his
suit is still barred because Saudi Arabia has not been designated as
a state sponsor of terrorism.5 3 As will be discussed, a foreign state
may be designated as a sponsor of terrorism for a lawsuit brought
by one party, but not so designated for purposes of another suit

brought by a different plaintiff.54 This limitation would appear
patently unfair.5 That a plaintiffs cause of action is rendered
valid or invalid, depending on a foreign state's status and
relationship with our government, is offensive to traditional
notions ofjustice. From the victim's point of view, no sense can be
made of holding some states liable while other states, engaged in
See, e.g., Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 886 F. Supp.
306 (1995), aff'd 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1204
(1997).
49 507 U.S. 349 (1993).
50 See supra note 38. One of two preconditions upon which a federal court
may acquire subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA is that the plaintiff be a
United States citizen at the time the cause of action arose. See Stethem v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 201 F. Supp. 2d 78, 86 (D.D.C. 2002) (citing 28
48

U.S.C. §1605(a)(7)(A) & (B)).
51 Scott Nelson was hired by a privately owed Saudi Arabian hospital.
Apparently in response to Nelson's repeated reports of safety violations at the
facility, hospital employees reported him to Saudi police, who arrested him.
Nelson, 507 U.S. at 352-53.

52 Nelson's claim was dismissed because his arrest was not based upon a
"commercial activity" under §1610(a)(2) of the Act. Saudi Arabia's tortious
acts, therefore, were immune from the jurisdiction of the federal court. Nelson,
507 U.S. at 363.
53 Baletsa, supra note 8, at
1287.
5
4 See text accompanying notes 214-16. In Roeder v. The Islamic Republic of
Iran, 195 F. Supp. 2d 140 (D.D.C. 2002), the court dismissed the FSIA claim
upon finding that Iran was not a designated state sponsor of terrorism at the time

of the terrorist act for which it was being sued, nor was it so designated as a
result of that act.
55 See Baletsa, supra note 8, at 1286-87.
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the same level of terrorist activity, retain immunity. 56 This policy
focuses on the actor rather than on the action and subjects the

victims of terrorism
57

to

the precariousness

of political

determinations.

September 11 th,58 in the minds of the American public, put
the country of Afghanistan on the map in the context of

terrorism. 59 With respect to terrorist organizations supported by
Afghanistan, the issue of state sponsorship is exceedingly
complicated. At the time of the attacks, Afghanistan was run by the
Taliban. 6° The Taliban has never been recognized as a national
government. 6 1 Therefore, even if it were shown that the Taliban

56

Daniel Wolf, Scott Nelson's counsel, stated, "There is no principled reason

for providing redress in our courts for American citizens who are tortured by
officials of foreign states on the Department's list, but denying such redress to
Americans who are tortured by officials of other countries." Baletsa, supra note
8, at 1288 (quoting Victims of Torture: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Int'l
Operations and Human Rights of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 104th
Cong. 88 (1996)).
57 See Baletsa, supra note 8, at 1288.
58 "9/11" is unquestionably considered the deadliest terrorist attack on
American citizens in history. See Allan Gerson, The Price of Terror: One Bomb.
One Plane. 270 Lives, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 30, 2001, at 2.
59 The hunt for Osama bin Ladan began soon after the 9/11 attacks, in the
mountains of Afghanistan. See Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, No. 01
Civ. 10132 (HB), 01 Civ. 10144 (HB) 200,1 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21712, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2001).
60 It is believed that the Taliban, the Islamic military faction which
ruled
Afghanistan at the time of the 9/11 attacks, knew the whereabouts of reputed
terrorist financier, Osama bin Ladan. See John F. Burns, A Nation Challenged:
The Taliban; Clerics Answer 'No, No, No!' and Invoke Fates of Past Foes, N.Y.
TIMES, September 22, 2001, at B3.
61 Neither the Taliban nor the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is currently
"recognized" by any country as a governmental entity. See Smith, 1 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21712, at *13 (plaintiffs, victims of the September 11, 2001 attack on the
World Trade Center, have a pending suit against Afghanistan, al Qaeda, and
Osama bin Ladan, pursuant to several federal anti-terrorism statutes). However,
the Taliban was previously recognized as a government by only Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. See Burns, supra note 60. In 1996, when
the Taliban had taken over most of Afghanistan by force, the U.S. State
Department expressed hope that the Taliban might finally bring stability to the
region. See Elaine Sciolino, State Dept. Becomes Cooler To the New Rulers of
Kabul, N.Y. TIMES, October 23, 1996, at A14.
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funded terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda62 or that it lent
material support to Osama bin Laden,63 who funded terrorist
organizations, the Taliban cannot be deemed a state sovereign. The
legal status of Afghanistan would logically fall outside the
jurisdiction of the FSIA since it is a non-governmental entity.
Therefore, Afghanistan cannot be designated as a state sponsor of
terrorism. It follows that plaintiffs wishing to sue the terrorist
groups found to be linked to the 9/11 attacks will have to find a
cognizable foreign state which has sponsored such groups.
Undoubtedly without seeking it, the Taliban and Afghanistan have
found a legal loophole to liability under the Anti-terrorism Act.
B.

Locating Foreign Assets within the United States

Satisfying a judgment is impossible without first locating
the defendant foreign state's assets within the United States.
Furthermore, defendant states certainly will not "hand over the
money voluntarily., 65 Without the help of the U.S. government,
finding foreign state assets poses a monumental problem for
plaintiffs. In an effort to reverse the effect of intervention by the
United States,66 which, ultimately served to undermine the
legislative purpose of the Anti-Terrorism Act, Congress enacted
67
legislation which forced the U.S. government to assist plaintiffs.
The Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
62 Al Qaeda has been legally deemed an "unincorporated association." See
Smith, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21712, at *11.
63 Osama bin Ladan, currently the target of a worldwide manhunt, has been
widely held responsible for the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade
Center as well as previous attacks on U.S. citizens. See Smith, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21712, at *9.
"American judgments are not automatically honored outside of the U.S. In
fact, the U.S. is not a party to any international treaty which proposes to
reciprocally honor domestic judicial orders. See Dellapenna, supra note 32, at
239. Section 1610(a)(7) of the FSIA removes immunity from attachment of
property located in the United States "if the judgment relates to a claim for
which the foreign state is not immune under section 1605(a)(7) ......
65 Margaret Cronin Fisk, After the Attacks, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 1, 2001, at A5
(citing comment by Aaron S. Podhurst, plaintiffs attorney in Alejandre, who
won a $187 million judgment against Cuba in 1996).
66See discussion infra Part I.C.
67 Baletsa, supra note 8, at 1293.
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Appropriations Act of 1999 amended sections of the FSIA to
subject certain foreign assets to attachment as long as the foreign
nation surrendered its immunity through any of the exceptions to
the FSIA.68 Furthermore, the executive branch is required to assist
FSIA plaintiffs in executing their judgments by locating blocked
assets of the foreign states for them. 69 However, what the
legislation gave with one pen stroke, it took away with another.
The provision simultaneously gives the President the power to
waive these requirements, leaving plaintiffs on their own once
more. 70 Thus, while the executive branch is legally obligated to
cooperate in sniffing out otherwise hidden financial interests held
by the foreign state, it may, at its own discretion (which it has been
known to freely exercise), refuse to assist plaintiffs and even
participate in thwarting their efforts.
Pub.L. No. 105-277, Title I, §117, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-491 (October 21,
1998). Section 117 added subsections 1610(f)(1)(A) & (B) to the FSIA.
Section 1610(f)(1)(A) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including but not
limited to section 208(f) of the Foreign Missions Act (22
U.S.C. 4308(f)), and except as provided in subparagraph (B),
any property with respect to which financial transactions are
prohibited or regulated pursuant to section 5(b) of the Trading
with the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. 5(b)), section 620(a) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2370(a)), sections
202 and 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1702), or any other proclamation, order,
regulation, or license issued pursuant thereto, shall be subject
to execution or attachment in aid of execution of any judgment
relating to a claim for which a foreign state (including any
agency or instrumentality of such state) claiming such
property is not immune under section 1605(a)(7).
This legislation even goes so far as to effectively supersede other U.S. laws
pursuant to which foreign assets are frozen. Baletsa, supra note 8, at 1294.
69 "Subsection (f)(2)(A) establishes requirements upon the Secretary of
the
Treasury and Secretary of State to assist in locating the blocked assets of
terrorist states in order to facilitate attachment and execution." Conference
Report on H.R. 4328, 144 CONG. REc. E2307 (daily ed. November 12, 1998)
(statement of Hon. Bill Pascrell, Jr. of New Jersey in the House of
Representatives).
7°See Flatow v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16, 25 (D.D.C.
1999). ("[T]he President may waive the requirements of this section in the
interest of national security." (quoting Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, Title I, § 117)).
61
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These conflicting attachment provisions were tested for the
first time in Flatow v. The Islamic Republic of Iran.71 When the
plaintiff levied writs of attachment on real property owned by Iran
located in the United States to satisfy a default judgment of over
$250 million, the U.S. government intervened and successfully
quashed the writs. 72
President Clinton exercised the
aforementioned waiver option immediately following the
attachment.73 Although the plaintiff argued that giving the waiver
provision this effect produces an "absurd - and hence
unsanctionable - result," the district court, in construing the
attachment and execution amendments of the FSIA, found
this
"counterbalancing" by Congress to be "entirely reasonable." 74
A crucial dilemma faced by the plaintiffs in Alejandre v.
Republic of Cuba,75 who obtained a default judgment of
$187,627,911 under the FSIA, was locating the funds of the Cuban
government that could be accessed here in the States.
Resourcefully, the Alejandre plaintiffs attempted to satisfy the
judgment by securing the funds through a garnishment action
against debts owed to Cuba by certain telecommunications
companies. 76 The district court had denied the U.S.'s motion to
dissolve the writs of garnishment because to grant it would not
only deny the plaintiffs their court-ordered remedy, but it would
"override the clear legislative policy against such terrorist attacks
and in favor of broadening the 7?roperty which may be executed
upon to compensate for them."7 Despite the fact that President
Clinton had promptly waived the requirements under the
attachment amendments, the district court denied the U.S.'s
motion. 78 The U.S. followed up with an appeal to the Eleventh
Circuit; however, the appellate court did not reach the issue of the

7' 76 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999).
72

Id. at 16.

73 Id. at 25 (citing Determination to Waive Requirements Relating to Blocked

Propertyof Terrorist-ListStates, 63 F. R. 59201 (1998)).
74

Id. at 26.

71 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997).

Alejandre v. Telefonica Larga Destancia De Puerto Rico, 183 F.3d 1277
(1 th Cir. 1999).
77 Id. at 1339.
78
Id. at 1279 (citing Pres.DeterminationNo. 99-1).
76
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President's waiver. 79 Instead, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the
district court's denial of the U.S. motion on other grounds. The
debt sought to be attached was found not to be owed to Cuba itself,
but to an entity deemed separate from Cuba; the court so held even
though the entity operated as a government instrumentality.80 The
plaintiffs were faced with overcoming a strong presumption in
favor of finding separate judicial status promulgated by
international public law.8 1 According to the court, a showing of
injustice, such as fraud, may surmount this presumption. 2
However, contrary to what the district court believed, the
unfairness of the plaintiffs' inability to collect a judgment, by
itself, was not enough.83 For the Alejandre plaintiffs, the court's
decision marked a collections dead end. 84
C.

United States Intervention to PreventAttachment

Even though Congress expanded the limitations inherent in
the FSIA for the purpose of broadening the range of attachable
assets held by terrorist foreign states, so as to make execution of
judgments in favor of American victims of terrorism more
probable and less problematic,8 5 the subsequent case law attests to
an entirely different result. The United States has consistently
79 id.

' 0 Id. at 1283-85.
81 Under FirstNat'l City Bank v. Banco ParaEl Comercio Exterior de Cuba,

462 U.S. 611 (1983), even if an entity is owned by the foreign state, there is a
"presumption of independent and separate legal status." Flatow v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 308 F.3d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 2002). In order to overcome
this presumption, plaintiffs would have to prove that the entity was, in fact, an
ego of the Cuban government. Alejandre, 183 F.3d at 1285.
alter
82
Alejandre, 183 F.3d at 1286.
83

84

Id. at 1286-87.
The Clinton administration did, however, release a limited amount of funds

($1.2 million) which were distributed to the Alejandre plaintiffs. See Vitrano,
supra note 25. The funds were taken from Cuban government bank accounts,

which were frozen by the U.S. in 1962. See Zaffuto, A "Pirate's Victory":
President Clinton's Approach to the New FSIA Exception Leaves the Victors
Empty-Handed, 74 TUL. L. REV. 685, 710 (1999).
8 See 28 U.S.C. §1610(a)(7);- see also Alejandre, 183 F.3d at 1287 (stating
that Congress intended to broaden the availability of property which may be

executed upon to benefit victims of terrorist attacks).
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demonstrated strong resistance to the recovery of judgments when
the attachment of foreign state-owned property is at stake. In
Flatow,86 the United States intervened on every occasion to
prevent the attachment of several Iranian properties located in the
U.S. 8 7 The Flatow case represents the quintessential illustration of
the stymied results encountered in attempting to execute a
judgment awarded under the Anti-terrorism Act.
Alisa Flatow, an American college student, was killed by a
terrorist suicide bomber in 1995 while she was traveling in Israel. 88
The Shaqaqi faction of Palestine Islamic Jihad claimed
responsibility for the bombing of the bus on which Alisa was a
passenger.89 It was found that the sole source of funding for the

Shaqaqi's terrorist activities came from the Islamic Republic of
Iran. 9° Alisa's father, Stephen Flatow, sued Iran under the FSIA
and the recently enacted "Flatow Amendment," the plaintiff's
namesake, and won a default judgment of over $240 million in
1998. 9 1 Subsequently, Flatow went about trying to collect on the

judgment by initiating enforcement proceedings throughout the
U.S.92

Flatow sought to attach Iran's diplomatic property, which
was located in Washington, D.C., but since President Clinton had
exercised his waiver authority, the U.S.'s motion to quash the writ
of attachment was granted. 93 The Flatow family also pursued the
attachment of an alleged Iranian owned property interest in
Maryland, but the action was likewise denied because the court
found that the record owner of the property was a non-profit
organization, possibly controlled by Iran, but nonetheless entitled
to a presumption of independent existence. 94 In their quest to find
non-immune property to attach in execution of the judgment
8

6 Flatow

87 See

v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998).

infra notes 93-113 and accompanying text.

8

Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 7-8.
'9 Id. at 8.
9 Id.
9' Id. at 34.

92 See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 67 F. Supp. 2d 535, 537 (D. Md.
1999), aff'd Flatow v Alavi Found., 225 F.3d 653 (4th Cir. 2000).
93 Flatow v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16, 24 (D.D.C.

1999).
94 Flatow, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 542.
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awarded to them, the Flatows made another attempt to combat the
U.S.'s intervention on behalf of Iran by placing a lien on a debt
owed to Iran. 95 The debt of $5 million was owed by none other
than the United States, awarded to Iran by the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal.96 Once the court determined that the property, which
included U.S. Treasury funds, belonged to the United States, the
United States declared its own sovereign immunity and the debt
became untouchable. 97 Regrettably, the same judge who awarded
the Flatows a $247.5 million judgment was compelled to grant yet
another U.S. motion, forestalling plaintiffs' relief.98 Relentlessly,
the Flatows pursued satisfaction of their judgment by attempting to
attach an arbitration award issued to Iran twelve years prior; this
time the writ was barred by the statute of limitations.99 Another
attempt by the Flatows failed when they tried to attach "all
property, trusts, credits or assets of any type whatsoever of either
defendant ...being held by the United States of America under the
jurisdiction of the DepartmentofDefense."'00 The attachment was
barred by the law of the case.' 0 '
In October, 2000, the FSIA was further amended by The
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (Victims
Protection Act),10 2 allowing certain victims of terrorist acts to
satisfy their outstanding judgments through the United States
Treasury.' 03 In January, 2001, pursuant to this Act, the Flatows
95

Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 74 F. Supp. 2d 18, 19 (D.D.C. 1999).

96 Id. at 20 (citing Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, Case No. A/27,
AWD No. 586-A27-FT, (Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (June 5, 1998))).
97 id.

98 Judge Lamberth acknowledged the "apparent unfairness" of the court's
ruling and expressed appreciation for the Flatows' frustration with the White
House's actions. Id. at 25-26; see also Flatow,76 F. Supp. 2d at 18.
99 Flatow, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 28.
10oFlatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, C.A. No. 97-396 (RCL), 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8910 *1 (D.D.C. June 6, 2000) (emphasis added).

101 Id. at *9 ("The principle of law of the case, which ensures that 'the same
issue presented a second time in the same case in the same court should lead to
the same result,' dictates that this writ also be quashed.").
102 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.

106-386, § 2002, 114 Stat. 1464, 1541-43 (2000).

See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 305 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
By electing to receive 100% of their compensatory damage awards, FSIA
plaintiffs give up their rights to execution and attachment with respect to
103
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were given $26 million, the amount of compensatory damages
awarded, on the condition that they relinquish "all rights to execute
against or attach property that is ... subject to section
1610((1)(A) of title 28, United States Code" (Anti-Terrorism
Act) 1 Despite this, Flatow filed a motion with the district court
to compel payment by the U.S. Treasury Department of postjudgment interest of the punitive damage award of $225 million
against Iran. 0 5 Unsurprisingly, the district court refused to
interpret the statute as holding the United States accountable for
the "indefinite obligation" of paying interest on the multi-million
dollar punitive damages award. 10 6 In the same action, Flatow also
opposed the modification of a subpoena to compel the United
States to assist in locating Iran's assets, a duty owed by the
Treasury under the FSIA, as amended by the Victim's Protection
Act.' 0 7 Flatow argued that the provision of the Victims Protection
Act at issue, ostensibly precluding Flatow's right to assistance by
the U.S. government since the right was abrogated by acceptance
of the compensatory damage award, was the product of closed
08
negotiations with members of Congress and the Executive.1
Flatow claimed that he had "struck a deal" .with members of the
government, permitting the attachment of certain Iranian properties
in order to satisfy the punitive damage award. 0 9 Conceding that
property that falls into any of three categories: (1) property that is "at issue in
claims against the United States before an international tribunal," (2) property
that is "the subject of awards rendered by such tribunal," or (3) property that is
"subject to section 1610(f)(1)(A) of title 28, United States Code." Flatow v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 201 F.R.D. 5, 9 (D.D.C. 2001), vacated by 305 F.3d
1249 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting the Victims Protection Act, § 2002(a)(2)(D)).
104 Flatow, 305 F.3d at 1251(citing section 2002(a)(2)(D) of the Victim's
Protection
Act).
'0sFlatow, 201 F.R.D. at 6.
'06 Id. at 10.
" Id. at 8-9. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f)(2)(A) (as amended by section 2002(0 of the
Victims Protection Act) states that the Treasury "should make every effort to
fully, promptly, and effectively assist any judgment creditor or any court that
has issued any such judgment in identifying, locating, and executing against the
property of that foreign state or any agency or instrumentality of such state."
'0 Flatow's brief asserted that negotiations were held with Jack Lew, Director
of the Office of Management and Budget and Stuart Eizenstat, Deputy Secretary
of the Treasury on behalf of President Clinton, and Senators Connie Mack (RFL.) and Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.) on behalf of the victim's families. Id. at 9.
109 Id.
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"legislation is the product of interest group negotiation and thus
should sometimes be interpreted so as to give each party the
benefit of the bargain," 110 the court nevertheless adhered to the
11
plain meaning of the Act's text and denied Flatow's opposition.
Upon appeal, the United States' argument that it was not a party to
the FSIA suit against Iran was enough to have2 Flatow's claim
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."
In December, 2001, the United States won another
argument against Flatow in the Ninth Circuit. Flatow sought to
attach property located in California, which was owned by an
Iranian bank.' 13 Flatow argued at the district level that the bank
was "extensively controlled" by Iran in order to show that the bank
and Iran were not separate entities, deserving separate juridical
status. 1 4 To support this proposition, Flatow introduced as
evidence Iran's own constitution, which expressly states that banks
are owned and administered by Iran. 1 5 The district court found
the nationalization of Iranian banks insufficient to overcome the6
presumption of independent status between the bank and Iran;"
therefore, the bank was not subject to execution of the judgment
against Iran. 117 However, the U.S. government was asked by the
Ninth Circuit Court to submit a-brief on the issue of whether the
anti-terror amendments to the FSIA vitiate this common law
presumption of separate juridical status." 8 Predictably, the United
States was able to persuade the court that it did not, and the
appellate court affirmed the lower court decision. 119
The Flatow family has not been able to execute their
judgment against Iran to date, 120 despite years of litigation against
0 Id.

at 10 (citing [Judge] Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U.

CHI. L. REv. 533, 535 (1983)).
111 Id.
112 Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 305 F.3d 1249, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
1i Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 308 F.3d 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002).
14 Id. at 1068; see also supra note 81.
"' Flatow, 308 F.3d at 1068.
16
'
Id. at 1073.
7 Id. at 1068.
11Id.

at 1071.

119 Id.
120 This

is notwithstanding the U.S. Treasury's reimbursement of $26 million

in compensatory damages. See supra text accompanying note 104.
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a foreign adversary and, effectively, their own government. As
Judge Lamberth put it:
[P]laintiff's efforts to satisfy his judgment against
Iran have proven futile. Indeed, in light of his lack
of success thus far, it appears that plaintiff Flatow's
original judgment against Iran has come to
epitomize the phrase "Pyrrhic victory." Yet, unless
or until Congress decides to enact a law that
authorizes the attachments plaintiff seeks, this Court
lacks the proper means to assist him with such
endeavors. 21
D.

Little or no property to attach

Currently, the United States does not have meaningful
diplomatic or economic relations with any of the seven nations
designated as state sponsors of terrorism. 122 It stands to reason that
those countries would not hold property interests within the United
States which would be amenable to attachment under section
1610(a)(7) of the FSIA.123 However, as was evidenced in the
Flatow proceedings, 124 some state sponsors of terrorism may have
attachable assets located within our borders. In response to the
attacks on U.S. citizenry on September 1 1 th, President Bush
ordered millions of dollars in assets, believed to be the source of
25
funding by various terrorist organizations, to be frozen.1
Whether any portion of this money will ever be susceptible to the
121Flatow v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16, 18 (D.D.C.
1999).
122 See Vitrano, supra note 25, at 238.
123 Id.; see also Ian Fisher, Combative Milosevic Displays a Flair for

Courtroom Tactics, at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/20/intemational/
europe/20MILO (Feb. 20, 2002) (stating that Iran and Cuba have few, if any,
assets in the U.S. not held by the U.S. Government). But see Fisk, supra note 65
(asserting that only Iran and Cuba, of the seven listed state sponsors of
may have assets in the U.S.).
terrorism,
124
See supra notes 93-113 and accompanying text.
125 See, 7 Families Sue bin Laden and Others for Billions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
20, 2002, at Al 1 [hereinafter 7 Families Sue]; see also Falk, supra note 44
(stating that approximately $300 million in assets of the Taliban and Afghan
terrorist groups have been seized by the U.S.).
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execution of judgments awarded to FSIA plaintiffs is entirely
uncertain.
Additionally, United States courts have been disinclined to
find third party corporations acting as agents or alter egos of
foreign states, even when it is fairly clear that these corporations
and purported charitable organizations are mere fronts for
defendant governments, thereby insulating them from the
execution of judgments. 126 In a situation analogous to that in
Alejandre,127 terrorist groups like al Qaeda128 are known to hide
assets in the United States behind the cover of legal businesses.
President Bush has publicly addressed this issue by announcing a
focus on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) which act as
fronts for terrorist groups. 129 Including such NGOs as targets
against the war on terror, the President has frozen the assets of
many individuals and organizations believed to be associated with
130
the terrorist groups suspected of perpetrating the 9/11 attacks.
Now that the monstrous effects of terrorism have hit home, it
remains to be seen whether the judiciary will display a change of
heart and be more inclined to pierce the corporate veil of terrorist
organizations hiding behind the shield of legitimate enterprise
within the United States.
Even if such foreign defendants do, in fact, have attachable
property located in the United States, it is highly unlikely that the
assets involved would be enough to satisfy the large judgment
sums awarded. 13 1 The awards won thus far against any single
foreign defendant have amounted to tens and hundreds of millions
126

See, e.g., Alejandre v. Telefonica Larga Destancia De Puerto Rico, 183

F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 1999); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 67 F. Supp. 2d
535, 537 (D. Md. 1999).
127 183 F.3d 1277. See supra text accompanying notes 75-83.
128 See Global Relief Found. v. N.Y. Times Co., No. 01 C 8821, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17081, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2002) ("President Bush publicly
identified Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network as the prime suspects
behind the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.").
129 See id. at *6.

See id. at *6-7 (stating that Executive Order 13224 targeted 27 individuals
and organizations, three of which were charitable or humanitarian).
131 See Early, Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran and the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act: Is Peace of Mind Enough?, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 203, 233-34
(1999).
130
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of dollars. 132 It is hard to imagine that a nation, which has been
codified by the United States as a state sponsor of terrorism, would
possess or have abandoned hundreds of millions of dollars worth
of property here.' 33 Over three thousand civilians died in the
September 11, 2001 terror attack.134 The number of casualties

multiplied by the number of compensatory and punitive dollars
which could potentially be awarded to the victims' families equals
an astronomical sum. In light of these figures, what was once
thought to be a "highly unlikely" possibility of executing
35
judgments under the FSIA looks, today, downright impossible.
II.

COMPETING INTERESTS AND RESOLUTION: POLITICAL
REASONS FOR U.S. INTERVENTION ON BEHALF OF STATE
SPONSORS OF TERRORISM

The overall goal of the Anti-terrorism Act was to assert the
United States' stance of being tough on terrorism.' 36 However, by
intervening in court actions on behalf of terrorists, the U.S. hardly
132

See, e.g., Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 184 F. Supp. 2d 13, 22-24

(D.D.C. 2002) (over $30 million in compensatory damages and $570 million in
punitive damages awarded); Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d
62, 69-70 (D.D.C. 1998) (compensatory damage award of $65 million; punitive
damages against the foreign state deemed prohibited under the statute); Flatow
v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 28, 32, 34 (D.D.C. 1.998) (over
$20 million in compensatory damages and $225 million in punitive damages
awarded, calculated as three times the annual expenditure for terrorist activities
by the Republic of Iran); Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F.Supp. 1239,
1253-54 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (nearly $50 million in compensatory damages and over
$137 million in punitive damages awarded).
133 But see supra note 125.
134 See Porter Anderson, The 'Great Struggle': Consoling the Living,
September 12, 2002, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/09/11/ar911.memorial.
main/index.
135 See Marcia Coyle, How Two Lawyers Brought a Suit They Just Might Win,
24 NAT'L L.J., No. 60, November 11, 2002, at Al (stating that three thousand
9/11 victims' families have filed suit in an attempt to win a $1 trillion
judgment).
136 "America will never tolerate terrorism. America will never abide terrorists.
Wherever they come from, wherever they go, we will go after them." Vitrano,
supra note 25, at 214 n.5 (quoting President Clinton on signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. Papers, Administration
of William J. Clinton, 1996, Book 1 (April 24, 1996)).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol18/iss4/8

22

Conway: Politics as Usual

2002

POLITICS AS USUAL

757

appears as tough as it claims to be. The Clinton administration
sought to pronounce its unwavering intolerance for terrorism. 137 It
went so far to make this point that it officially circumscribed any
act of terrorism and revoked all of the protection traditionally
enjoyed by sovereigns through a long-standing principle of
immunity. To enact legislation for this express purpose, and then to
simultaneously provide for an overriding provision which has the
effect of obliterating that purpose, does not convince that the U.S.
has taken any stand.1 38 Without allowing the legislation to have
"teeth," it also appears that the amendments were merely symbolic
and not truly remedial. 139 If the Anti-terrorism Act, indeed, proves
to have no practical value, then it ergo fails as a symbolic gesture
the
as well because, "Protecting the assets of terrorists is absolutely
'' 4°
wrong message to send to killers of American citizens.
Of course, not everyone views the U.S.'s intervention in
FSIA suits as demonstrating a weak posture with respect to
terrorism. As government lawyers have explained, "a commitment
to the rule of law should not be mistaken for weakness in the face
of terrorist violence." 141 As far as the White House is concerned,
U.S. intervention proves the government's commitment to foreign
relations, which, in turn serves only to protect the American people
against foreign hostility. Both the Bush and Clinton
administrations have expressed concern over allowing judgments
to come from frozen assets for fear of compromising foreign
policy. 142 Therefore, the U.S. is faced with a conflict; this conflict
lies generally in its responsibilities both to its citizenry in
condemning terrorism and to its international colleagues in

See id.; see also supra note 42.
"Overall, the administration's approach seems illogical." Zaffuto, supra
note 84, at 710.
139 See Early, supra note 131, at 230.
140 See Zaffuto, supra note 84, at 709 (citing Obey, White House Lines Up
137
138

Behind Iran in Federal Case, FORWARD, July 24, 1998, at 1998 WL 11416354
(quoting Representative Matt Salmon )).
141 See Miller & Mintz, Once-Supportive U.S. Fights Family Over Iranian
Assets, WASH. POST, September 27, 1998, at A8.
142 See Neely Tucker, In Lawsuit Against Iran, Former Hostages Fight US.;
Government Calls Frozen Assets Untouchable, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2001, at
Al.
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maintaining effective foreign relations. 143 This quandary 1 places
the U.S. government in "a terribly uncomfortable position."
The United States intervenes in pending FSIA actions by
filing a "statement of interest.' 45 This interest can be expressed in
broad terms, such as when the government intervenes in the
"interest of national security," which the aforementioned waiver
provision of the FSIA addresses. 46 Other asserted interests
involve specific international treaty agreements under which the
U.S. is bound and which appear to countervail plaintiffs' interests.
In Flatow, for instance, the U.S. government raised both the FSIA
waiver authority of the President as well as the restraints placed
upon it pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act, the Foreign Missions Act and the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations.' 47 The court went no further than the FSIA
itself to hold that the plaintiffs attachment of Iranian properties
was barred because the president had waived the statute's
requirements of attaching blocked property.1 48 In Roeder v. The
Islamic Republic of Iran,149 the court was powerless to even hear
the FSIA suit because the Algiers Accords precluded a cause of
action for the Roeder plaintiffs. 5 0
With respect to international agreements, the U.S.
maintains at least two concerns of great importance. First, the U.S.
must contend with the likelihood of reciprocal breaches of various
"[T]he United States is now caught in this... odd position of.. .having to
CBS This Morning: Senator
either back a citizen or warm relations."
Lautenberg and Stephen Flatow Discuss Flatow's Lawsuit Against the Iranian
Government After an Islamic Jihad Bomb Tore Through a Bus and Killed His
Daughter in 1995 (CBS television broadcast, September 28, 1999) (CBS News
Transcripts), available at www.lexis.con/research/transcripts [hereinafter CBS
This Morning] (statement of Stephen Flatow during interview by Russ Mitchell);
see Early, supra note 131, at 229.
144 See Coyle, supra note 135 (quoting international law scholar, Robert
Goldman, American University Washington College of Law).
145 In Flatow v. Islamic Republic ofIran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999), the
United States appeared pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517, which allows the U.S. to
"attend to the interests of the Unites States" in a pending suit. Id. at 18.
146 Id. at 25; see also supra note 70 and accompanying text.
147 Flatow, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 18.
141

148

Id.

195 F. Supp. 2d 140 (D.D.C. 2002).
150 See infra note 209 and accompanying text.

149
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treaty agreements around the world; by breaking its own
Second, the
international accords, it invites negative reciprocity.'
U.S. must maintain credibility for itself in a global forum; defying
international policy and agreements could seriously damage the
U.S.'s reputation as an international political participant.152 As a
judicial matter, courts are likely to be without authority to
agreements with the remedial provisions of
reconcile international
153
the FSIA.
Economic leverage is one of the purported interests held by
the United States.1 54 Without the inclusion of the Presidential
waiver provision in the FSIA, a potential threat is posed to the
power of the President in using such assets as leverage when
economic sanctions are imposed on targeted sovereigns. 155 Frozen
assets, for instance, can potentially be put to future use as
"bargaining chips" with foreign states. 156 Economic clout is just
one of the weapons in the arsenal of international power; does it
justify undermining the purposes for which the Anti-terrorism Act
was designed to accomplish?
Within the realm of economic strategy in combating
terrorism, there appears to be some overlap in the interests of
foreign policy and plaintiff recovery. By allowing plaintiffs to
attach foreign property in order to collect on a judgment the goal of
imposing an economic sanction on terrorists would seem to be
accomplished on behalf of the government. The interests of the
U.S. might be well served by relinquishing the power of this type
of economic leverage to American citizens and the U.S. judiciary.
This is, after all, consistent with the main premise of the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity.' 57 It also directly carries out a
primary objective of the Anti-terrorism Act in depleting the
'51 See Early, supra note 131, at 229.
152 See id.

153 See, e.g., Roeder, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 140.
154 See Zafflito, supra note 84, at 710.
155See id.
15660 Minutes: In Memory of Alisa; After Going to Great Lengths to Get the
Right to Sue a Terrorist State, a Victim's FatherFinds His Own Government
Won't Let Him Collect His Settlement (CBS television broadcast, October 4,
1998) (CBS News Transcripts), available at www.lexis/research/transcripts
[hereinafter 60 Minutes: In Memory ofAlisa].
157 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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economic resources of terrorist groups. Consistent with this goal,
Senator Lautenberg said, "[N]o nation can pick on American
citizens without our country responding in some lawful but direct
way. Short8 of military action, the best response is to hit them in the
'5
wallet."'
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it has been suggested that
the legal dilemma in FSIA proceedings boils down to a balancing
of competing interests between the United States and the plaintiffs,
and that this balance always tips in favor of the U.S.' 9 This is the
thrust of the conflict faced by the U.S. in attempting to meet its
obligations both at home and abroad and this is the reasoning
behind the U.S.'s perceived betrayal of its own citizens who seek
redress under the FSIA. To say that the U.S. has successfully
blocked the attachment of foreign property in these suits because
its interests have weighed more heavily in the balance is to view
the issues at stake too narrowly. It is true that executive action
authorized by Congress is "supported by the strongest of
160
presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation."'
However, in preventing the attachment of the properties in
question, the United States has not won a legal battle, per se. The
defendants in FSIA actions are state sponsors of terrorism, not the
United States. Contrary to the beliefs of many FSIA plaintiffs that
"their courtroom foe is not their tormentors, but the U.S.
government,"'' the United States does not appear in these actions
to defend the interests of foreign defendants. Ostensibly, plaintiffs
are placed in, what Stephen Flatow has called, "the surreal position
of being opposed by the [U.S. government].' 62 The U.S.'s
15' Zaffuto, supra note 84, at 711 (internal citations omitted). But see Review
by Emily Altman, The Price of Terror: One Bomb. One Plane. 270 Lives,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 30, 2001, at 2 ("[J]ust how realistic is it that terrorists who might
be undeterred by the threat of American military force must now weigh the
possibility of retaliation by the world's largest contingent of lawyers?") (quoting
Allan
Gerson and Jerry Adler's book).
15 9 See Early, supra note 131, at 234.
160 Flatow v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16,
20 (D.D.C.
1999) (in attacking this presumption, the plaintiff has a heavy burden of
persuasion).
161 Tucker, supra note 142.
162 Baletsa, supra note 8, at 1293 (quoting Stephen Flatow, Keep Fighting,
JERUSALEM POST

at 10 (September 1, 1998)).
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appearance in these suits does give the impression that it is fighting
63
to protect the interests of the foreign state sponsor of terrorism.1
However, "[n]otwithstanding
how [the U.S.] appears,"
spokespersons for the United States have, on numerous occasions,
denied that the purpose of intervention is to defend the interests of
state sponsors of terrorism. 164 Perhaps in an effort to counterpoise
its image, in its Statement of Interest presented to the Flatow court,
the United States professed that it was not acting on behalf of the
defendant and "expressly condemns the acts that brought about the
judgment in this case. '
While it may not offer much consolation to the victims of
terrorism, the White House has defended its position by cautioning
that if the U.S. were to attach diplomatic properties, "then other
countries could retaliate, placing our embassies and citizens
overseas at grave risk.' 66 For this reason, "diplomatic property
must remain sacrosanct."'1 67 This rationale is certainly objectively
reasonable, but plaintiffs like Stephen Flatow cannot be expected
to be understanding. In Flatow's view, "Protecting Iranian assets of
any type is equivalent to the FBI director saying he's tough on
gangsters but needs to be sensitive to the Mob.' 6 In another
statement, Flatow confessed to his inability to see things from a
diplomatic perspective: "I can't be diplomatic; I lost a child to
163See

Marcia Coyle, Hostages of the Law; Ex-Iran Captives' Obstacle to

Award for Damages is the US. Government, 24 NAT'L L.J., No. 24, February
18, 2002, at Al (quoting David Roeder who stated that the U.S. is, "in effect
defending Iran"); see also Commemorating the Fourth Anniversary of the
Brothers to the Rescue Shootdown, 146 CONG. REc. S779 (daily ed. Feb. 24,
2000) [hereinafter Brothers to the Rescue] (speaker Senator Mack Inl (R-Fla),
accused the U.S. government of entering the Alejandre lawsuit on the side of
Fidel Castro).
'64 See Tucker., supra note 142 (quoting James Gilligan, a Justice Department
lawyer); 60 Minutes: In Memory of Alisa, supra note 156 (comment of State
Department spokesman, James Rubin, that the U.S. is not representing Iran in
Flatow case).
165Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 305 F.3d 1249, 1252 (D.D.C.
2002).
'66 See Laurence Arnold, Clinton Blocks Budget Provision Meant to Help NJ
Family, Assoc. PRESS SERV., October 22, 1998 (quoting White House
spokesperson).
67 60 Minutes: In Memory of Alisa, supra note 156 (comment of State
Department spokesman, James Rubin).
'68 See Arnold, supra note 166 (quoting Stephen Flatow).
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terrorism; now I'm losing U.S. support., 169 Faced with this
perspective, it seems implausible for the U.S. to reconcile the
conflict between its political actions and
incongruous legal conduct
70
to the satisfaction of FSIA plaintiffs.
It seems that no matter how compelling the interest is in
maintaining national security, or how rational their arguments may
be that they are not siding with the enemy, the U.S. government
comes across as villainous. The anti-terrorism message is simply
not getting through; instead, the U.S. is sending a mixed message
and the anti-terrorism legislation is creating more conflict than it
sought to resolve. 171 Representative Jim Saxton castigated the
Clinton administration as "making a grave mistake in adopting the
policy that the protection of Iranian assets is more important than
justice for these victims.' ' 172 Judge James Lawrence King, who
wrote the District Court opinion in Alejandre said:
The court notes with great concern that the very
President who in 1996 decried this terrorist action
by the Government of Cuba now sends the
Department of Justice to argue before this Court
that Cuba's blocked assets ought not be used to
compensate the families of the U.S. nationals
murdered by Cuba. The Executive branch's
approach to this situation has been inconsistent at
best. It now apparently believes that shielding a
terrorist foreign state's assets is more important
than compensating for the loss of American lives. 173
169 See Vitrano, supra note 25, at 214 n.8.
170 The U.S. legislature has sought to strike

a balance between victims' needs
and national security. Congress passed bills in 1998 and 2000 allowing $400
million to be paid out of the U.S. Treasury in certain cases. See supra note 103.
However, not only are these funds limited, but the legislation does nothing to
deter terrorism. See Tucker., supra note 142.
171In Roeder v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 195 F. Supp. 2d 140, 144
(D.D.C. 2002), the court characterized the FSIA litigation for the plaintiffs as a
continued "roller coaster ride."
172 See Zaffuto, supra note 84, at 709 (citing Obey, White House Lines Up
Behind Iran in Federal Case, FORWARD, July 24, 1998, at 1998 WL 11416354
(internal citations omitted) (quoting Representative Matt Salmon)).

173
Alejandre v. The Republic of Cuba, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1332 n.16 (S.D.
Fla. 1999).
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Informed of the experiences of previous FSIA plaintiffs,
Terry Anderson filed suit against Iran for its sponsorship of the
Hezbollah, the terrorist organization which held Anderson and
others hostage for six years. 174 In anticipation of litigation, he
stated: "much of our argument is likely to be with the U.S.
government, rather than the Iranian government."' 175 The Flatow,
Alejandre, and Roeder families are all too familiar with being
placed in this position. 176 Having demonstrated the executive
branch's predilections in the past, future plaintiffs will also quickly
come to understand that part, if not all, of the battle they will wage
will be with their own government; that is, unless the current
administration redeems the Executive branch's reputation as a
and makes a clear showing of
devoted warrior against terrorism
177
on.
are
they
side
whose
exactly
Aside from the questions of national loyalty and competing
interests, the fundamental question remains: does United States
intervention in FSIA suits render foreign defendants judgment
proof?178 As Stephen Flatow once remarked, "[m]aybe American
policy is a joke." 79 Judge Lamberth, who has presided over many
FSIA cases over the past few years and who has empathetically
expressed his great frustration along with those plaintiffs, seems to
foster some hope for change in the future. In Eisenfeld v. Islamic
must express its conviction
Republic ofIran, he said, "the court ...

Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F. Supp. 107 (D.D.C. 2000).
Zaffuto, supra note 84, at 715 (citing Arlene Levinson, Ex-Hostage
Anderson Suing Iranfor Lost Years, ATLANTA CONST., March 22, 1999, at A6
(quoting Terry Anderson) (internal citations omitted)).
174
See
175

176

See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 1999)

(U.S.'s motion to quash writs of attachment of three parcels of Iranian-owned
property and two bank accounts, granted); Alejandre v. Telefonica Larga
Destancia De Puerto Rico, 183 F.3d 1277 (1lth Cir. 1999) (garnishment action

vacated upon U.S. appeal); Roeder, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 140 (U.S.'s motion to
dismiss granted).
177Stephen Flatow stated that the judge in his case asked the attorneys for the
U.S., "Whose side are you on?" 60 Minutes: In Memory of Alisa, supra note

156.
178 Given the likelihood of collection of judgments awarded under the Antiterrorism Act, some critics believe that, ultimately, state sponsors of terrorism
remain immune. See, e.g., Early, supra note 131, at 232.
'79

60 Minutes: In Memory ofAlisa, supra note 156.
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that ultimately this judgment will not be a mere Pyrrhic victory
,,180

III.

COMPARISON OF POLITICAL CLIMATES OF THE CLINTON
AND BUSH ADMINISTRATIONS AND THE "NEW AND
IMPROVED" FSIA

The fundamental objective in initially amending the FSIA

was not ultimately achieved. American victims of terrorism were
supposed to be given an apolitical arena for resolution of claims
against foreign states. Instead, the Anti-terrorism Act has brought

politics back into the forefront of consideration. It has done this in
two ways: by giving the Department of State the power to decide

jurisdiction in deeming a foreign state immune or amenable to
suit' 8 1 and by giving the President the power to block recovery of

judgments through the waiver provision of the statute."8 2

The

Anti-Terrorism Act, vulnerable to political whims, remains,
therefore, a legal wild card ensuring only unpredictable

outcomes.' 83 Setting aside the onslaught of criticism that has
emerged to confront these inconsistencies, 184 the FSIA, although a

legal doctrine, is fraught with political ramifications, subject,
therefore, to political forces.

180

172 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2000).

'81By applying the statute to only those nations designated as state sponsors of
terrorism, the amendment "re-injects the unpredictable political element that the
drafters of the FSIA desperately tried to remove." Baletsa, supra note 8, at 1278.
Unless the exception includes all states, not just those designated by the State
Department as terrorist sponsors, the provision cannot be based on principle and
not politics. See Vadnais, The Terrorism Exception to the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act: Forward Leaning Legislation or Just Bad Law?, 5 UCLA J.
INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 199, 226 (2000).
182See supra note 70.
183See Vadnais, supra note 181, at 221.
184Baletsa, supra note 8, at 1299 n.323 ("Congress should never have passed,
nor President Clinton signed, a law that could only offer Mr. Flatow justice by
depriving the administration of control over important foreign policy. This law
should be repealed.") (quoting, Editorial: Lawsuits and Terrorism, WASH. POST,
Dec. 26, 1999, at B6); see Brothers to.the Rescue, supra note 163 (Senator Mack
stated to the President, "The executive branch's approach to this situation has
been inconsistent at best.").
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The "experiment" of the FSIA amendments was, at the very
least, a noble one. The Anti-terrorism Act was motivated by a call
for justice in punishing and, hopefully, putting an end to the
cruelty and insidiousness of global terrorism. 185 Subsequent FSIA
amendments were further inspired by a sublime compassion for the
victims of terrorism whose pain was suffered as the price of being
American.
However, many would agree that the Clinton
administration created a monster in its political experiment of
enacting the 1996 and 1998 amendments to the FSIA. Now the
question is, will the Bush administration allow this experiment to
continue to run awry, tame it, or destroy it? Perhaps the more
immediate question is, what can President Bush afford to do in this
highly charged political climate of fear and
patriotism in the wake
18 6
of our nation being besieged by terrorism?
Ultimately, these noble gestures by the Congress and
Clinton Administration left victims of terrorism with a right but
not a remedy. 187 American victims were not only provided with
the statutory right to sue terrorists, they were encouraged to pursue
remedies under the FSIA. In the course of personal conversations
with Stephen Flatow, President Clinton urged him to sue Iran
under the Anti-Terrorism Act.' 88 For those plaintiffs who relied on
185 See Conference Report on H.R. 4328, 144 CONG. REc. E2307 (daily ed.

November 12, 1998) ("[The statute] is designed to send a message around the
globe to those nations who sponsor terrorism.. .your assets are no longer
protected from justice. The reality of significant financial loss to terrorist states
will be a critical deterrent to further acts of terrorism targeted at the citizens of
this country.") (statement of Hon. Bill Pascrell, Jr.).
186 See Statement by the President in Address to the Nation, FED. INFO. &
NEWS DISPATCH, INC., White House Press Releases, Sept. 11, 2001:
Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom
came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist
acts. Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil,
despicable acts of terror. The pictures of airplanes flying into
buildings, fires burning, huge structures collapsing, have filled
us with disbelief, terrible sadness, and a quiet, unyielding
7

anger.

Baletsa, supra note 8, at 1301.
188See 60 Minutes: In Memory of Alisa, supra note 156 (President Clinton
telephoned Mr. Flatow to express his condolences. On another occasion, Clinton
praised Flatow for his courage in filing suit against Iran); CBS This Morning,
supra note 143 (Flatow stating that he was "astounded" to learn of the
government's intervention on behalf of Iran in his suit against them).
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such governmental assurances to obtain some justice for the
horrific wrongs perpetrated against them by terrorists, the results
have been especially appalling. 189 The same government that
offered them hope for justice stood in the way of it.190 Mr. Flatow
commented at that time that the law gave him a weapon.1 9' Years
after the initial shock of having to fight the U.S. government in
court over the attachment of Iranian assets, Stephen Flatow stated,
"I got into this suit to put Iran out of the terrorism business. What I
got instead was a cat fight with State, Treasury and Justice [sic]
Departments."' 192 In her testimony before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, Maggie Khule, sister of Armando Alejandre, a victim
of the "Brothers to the Rescue" shoot-down, said, "[n]o words can
possibly explain our shock when we went to court and found U.S.
attorneys sitting down at the same table as Cuba's attorneys. The
Clinton administration has shut its doors to us." 193 Many years
after his release from captivity for 444 days, during the infamous
Iran hostage crisis in 1979, David Roeder, a U.S. Air Force
attache, commented on his lawsuit brought pursuant to the FSIA:
"It never occurred to me when I was getting the crap beat out of
me in a Tehran jail cell that I would have to one day fight the same
government that I was defending. It's just so demoralizing. So
discouraging."' 94 These are just a few of the reactions from
plaintiffs whose hopes for justice were ultimately defeated by the
very legal weapon that had held the promise for such hope. There
is no doubt that the best intentions of our government exacerbated
the pain these plaintiffs have already suffered at the hands of other
governments.
189 See Brothers to the Rescue, supra note 163 ("When the President and his

administration give assurances and advice, and American families trust and obey
this advice only to be dragged along and let down, the administration commits a

great injustice.") (remarks of Senator Mack).
190
Referring to the Alejandre plaintiffs in his remarks to the President and
Congress, Mack stated that the Clinton administration "encouraged the families
to postpone closure and pursue legal action" but then began to oppose them.
"They entered the lawsuit on the side of Fidel Castro." Brothers to the Rescue,
supra note 163 (statements of Senator Mack).
91See 60 Minutes: In Memory ofAlisa, supra note 156.
192 See Tucker, supra note 142.
'9'
See Brothers to the Rescue, supra note 163.
'94 See Tucker, supra note 142.
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Since the invocation of the Anti-Terrorism Act concededly
involves the participation of all three branches of the U.S.
government, the force of public opinion is undeniable. The type of
magnanimous support for fellow Americans as was demonstrated
by Congress and President Clinton upon the passage of the antiterrorism legislation has today, post-9/1 1, become downright
"politically correct." 195 Currently, national sentiment expects
nothing less. In his Address to the Nation on September 11, 2001,
President Bush proclaimed, "we stand together to win the war
against terrorism."' 196
Before September 11 th, U.S. legal
intervention on behalf of terrorist organizations may have been
considered, by the American public, a Clinton administration faux
pas. Many would consider such un-American behavior intolerable

today. The emotional pulse of our nation today is incomparable to
what it was during the reign of President Clinton. At present, we
are at war. 19 7 In the immediate aftermath of the attack of
September 11 th, President Bush referred to the familiar campaign
of "the war against terrorism." 198 The meaning of terrorism has
been recently redefined in the collective consciousness of the
American people. President Bush has characterized the campaign

of terrorism against U.S. citizens as "evil"'199 on so many occasions
that acts of terrorism may never again be thought of as something
195

In the ensuing days after September 11 h, political correctness rose to a

fever pitch. "Bill Maher, host of ABC's 'Politically Incorrect,' is under attack.
Viewers are angry. Several affiliates have dropped him. His show is teetering
on the brink of cancellation, all because he said the terrorists who attacked the
World Trade Center weren't cowards. Rather, he said, 'We have been the
cowards lobbing cruise missiles from 2,000 miles away. That's cowardly."'
Jonah Goldberg, 'PoliticallyIncorrect' Wounded, WASH. TIMES, September 29,
2001, at A14.
196 Statement by the Presidentin Address to the Nation, supra note 186.
197 President Bush declared, "We're at war. We will not only
deal with those
who dare attack America, we will deal with those who harbor them and house
them and feed them." Evan Thomas & Mark Hosenball, Bush: 'We're at War',
NEWSWEEK, September 24, 2001, at 26.
198 Statement by the Presidentin Address to the Nation, supra note 186.
199 "Today, our nation saw evil" was one of four times the President used the
term "evil" in his address to the nation on September 11, 2001. Statement by the
Presidentin Address to the Nation, supra note 186; see Serge Schemann, US.
Attacked; President Vows to Exact Punishment for "Evil", N.Y. TIMES,
September 12, 2001, at Al.
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remote from the American experience. American courts, having
recently become all too familiar with the atrocious results of
terrorist activity, have publicly expressed their outrage as well.
"Terrorism. . .is the implacable enemy of all civilization under
law., 20 0 Terrorism invokes all that Americans now hate and

fear. 20 1 Given this, it would seem likely that the attorneys acting
on behalf of the United States would be pursuing a different
agenda than they had during the Clinton days of court battles over
enforcement proceedings under the FSIA.
However, in the year following September 11, 2001, no

such shift in practice has, thus far, been evidenced in the federal
courts. The Roeder202 case provides one of the few examples of

U.S. intervention since 9/11. More than twenty years ago, the
Iranian government, now listed as the State Department's number
one sponsor
of terrorism,20 3 held 52 Americans hostage for 444
204
days.
The hostages, who had endured extraordinary mental and
physical torture throughout the duration of their confinement,
initiated several suits. 2° 5 These suits were dismissed because,
during that time, Iran still retained sovereign immunity.20 6 It was

not until the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act that the Iranian
200

Wagner v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 128, 138 (D.D.C.

2001).
201 See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1, 23 (D.D.C.
1998) ("[T]errorism has achieved the status of almost universal condemnation,
as have slavery, genocide, and piracy.. .the terrorist is the modem era's hosti
humani generis - an enemy of all mankind .... ).
202 Roeder v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 195 F. Supp. 2d 140 (D.D.C.
2002).
203
See Neely Tucker, Iran Loses $42 Million Judgment in HijackSuit, WASH.
POST, January 23, 2002, at A3 (Iran is listed by the State Department as "the
world's biggest sponsor of terrorism").
204 Roeder, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 143.
205 See Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1983); Ledgerwood
v. State of Iran, 617 F. Supp. 311 (D.D.C. 1985). See also Roeder, 195 F. Supp.
2d at 145-47 (finding that the hostages were imprisoned under inhumane living
conditions, beaten, repeatedly interrogated and occasionally awakened in the
middle of the night to be present for their own (feigned) execution ceremonies;
one former hostage testified that his captors told him that his wife and children
were in danger, describing exactly where his son went to school and on what bus

he206rode).

See Roeder, 195 F. Supp. 2d. at 144.
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hostages were able to bring a cause of action and win a default
judgment against Iran. 20 7 In October 2001, when the trial on the
issue of damages was about to commence, the United States
intervened to dismiss the suit brought under the FSIA.2 ° Unlike
previous challenges made during the Clinton administration in
FSIA cases, however, the United States was obligated under the
Algiers Accords to block the suit; it was this agreement, which
released nearly $8 billion in frozen Iranian assets that freed the
hostages at the end of the Carter administration. 20 9 The hostages
argued that the Accords should be superseded by the AntiTerrorism Act. 210 The power to abrogate the Accords was deemed
to be outside the purview of the judiciary and relegated exclusively
to the legislative and the executive branches. 211 21As
a result, the
2
dismissed.
was
case
the
and
judgment was vacated
Tangentially, several interesting issues emerged from the
Roeder case, which seem to further cloud the already murky waters
of the largely uncharted FSIA. Upon granting the United States'
motion to intervene, 2 13 and in examining the United States' motion
to vacate the default judgment entered against Iran, the district
court found that the case was subject to dismissal due to a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. 214 The 1996 AntiTerrorism Act states that jurisdiction will be lacking if the foreign
state is "not designated as a state sponsor of terrorism.. .at the time
the act occurred, unless later so designated as a result of such
act.''215 The U.S. government made its case on the tenuous
argument that since the designation of Iran as a state sponsor of
terrorism occurred three years after the hostage calamity it shows
'that the decision by the State Department had nothing to do with

207
208

Id.
Id.

209

See id. at 166; see also Tucker., supra note 142.

210

Roeder, 195 F.Supp. 2d. at 151, 153.

211 Id. at
212

145.

Id. 180-82, 185-86.

The United States filed an Emergency Motion to Intervene, arguing its
entitlement to do so pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 24(a) and
showing a "cognizable interest" in the outcome of the litigation. Id. at 154-55.
214 Id. at 160.
215
Roeder, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 160 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)).
213
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the hostages.216 Consequently, the plaintiffs were again precluded
from bringing suit under the FSIA for the hostage ordeal.
Knowing this, Congress once again acted to ensure
protection of American plaintiffs' rights by "interfering" with the
ongoing litigation. 217 One month after the U.S. government filed its
motion to vacate the Roeder judgment (two months after the
attacks on the World Trade Center) President Bush signed an
appropriations bill amending the FSIA.21 8 This action, known as
subsection 626(c), specifically cited the Roeder case in removing
Iran's immunity from suit "in a case brought by the 1979 Tehran
219
hostages in the District Court for the District of Columbia."
This was the first time a specific case was put into the statutory
text of the Anti-terrorism Act and Roeder is the only case to which
subsection 626(c) could apply. 220 This new legislation gave the
district court the authority to hear the case. However, while it
appeared that the government was doing its best to proclaim and
even clarify its support for these American plaintiffs, subsection
626(c) could be the quintessential "right-without-a-remedy"
legislative amendment. Upon signing the bill, President Bush said:
To the maximum extent permitted by applicable
law, the executive branch will act, and encourage
the courts to act, with regard to subsection 626(c) of
Id.
I6

The decision to designate Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism was

"based on convincing evidence of a broad Iranian policy of furthering terrorism
beyond its borders." Id. (quoting the Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 84, No.
2084, 77 (March, 1984)).
217 Id. at 145. The court seemed irate over the separation of powers regime
being threatened by Congress' apparent interference, which was admittedly
intended to "quash" the United States' motion to vacate the judgment. Id. at
166. The Roeder court declined to resolve the Article III problem because the
legislation could not affect any future cases and the case could be dismissed on
other grounds. Id.
218 Justice, Commerce, and Treasury Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No.
107-77, § 626(c), 115 Stat. 748, 803 (amending 28 U.C.S. § 1605(a)(7)(A)); Id.
at 145. In December of 2001, Congress acted again by passing a rider to explain
the intent behind Section 626(c). Id. at 152-53 (citing Section 208 of the
Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub.
L. No. 107-117, 115 Stat. 2230).
2'9 Roeder, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 152 (citing Statement by the President,
November 28, 2001, available at 2001 WL 1509507 (White House) (quoting
President Bush upon signing the new law)).
220

Id. at 164-65.
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the Act in a manner consistent with the obligations
of the United States under the Algiers Accords that
achieved the release of the U.S. hostages in 1981.221

Subsection 626(c) removed the obstacle of Iran's sovereign
immunity for its acts arising out of the hostage crisis, thereby
giving the federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over the
Roeder claim. However, the President's remarks make it clear that
the agreement with Iran under the Algiers Accords prevents the
court from establishing subject matter jurisdiction over the claims
for a different reason.222 Equivocally (if not hypocritically), the
government's actions with respect to subsection 626(c) do nothing
more than supplant one restriction to jurisdiction with another,
leaving the Roeder plaintiffs at the exact same jurisdictional road
block they encountered in the 1980s. 223 In reaction to this, the
Roeder court stated, "Both Congress and the President have
expressed their support for these plaintiffs' quest for justice while
failing to act
definitively to enable these former hostages to fulfill
224
quest."
that
As frustrated as the Roeder court was in being restrained
from granting the hostages a remedy 225 and as much as previous
decisions in the circuit had permitted jurisdiction for suits against
foreign states, the Roeder decision stated that the Anti-terrorism
226
Act did not create a cause of action against foreign governments.
22tId. at

152 (citing Statement by the President, November 28, 2001, available
at 2001 WL 1509507 (White House) (quoting President Bush upon signing the
new law)).
222 Although not specifically mentioned as such, the decision by the Roeder
court to dismiss the case was likely based on the political question doctrine.
223

224

See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.

Roeder, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 145.
Id. ("Were this Court empowered to judge by its sense of justice, the heartbreaking accounts of the emotional and physical toll of those 444 days on
plaintiffs would be more than sufficient justification for granting all the relief
225

that they request.").

Id. at 172. But see Cronin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 99-2890 (RCL),
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24115 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 2002). Based on the
suggestiveness of the text, the legislative history and subsequent amending of
226

the statute, the Cronin court held that the Flatow Amendment does create a
cause of action against the culpable foreign state itself. Cronin, 2002 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 24115, at *24.
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The District Court for the District of Columbia seemed to notice,
for the first time, that the cause of action created by the Flatow
Amendment can only be pursued against the "official, employee,
or agent" of a foreign state which participates in terrorist
activity. 227 The court rejected the plaintiffs arguments for a claim
against Iran even after they had cited the many landmark cases
brought pursuant to the Act in the District Court for the District of
Columbia. The Roeder court said that the previous opinions of the
court22 merely show "the lengths to which the Court had to go to
interpret these [FSIA] provisions consistently." 229 Interestingly,
the court noted that the previous cases cited had gone forward with
default judgments without the "benefit" of the United States'
"adept demonstration of the flaws in plaintiff's interpretation of the
statutes at issue." 230 This suggests that the U.S. Solicitor General
under the Bush administration is an even fiercer opponent to be
reckoned with for American victims of terrorism. While the
Roeder court did not hold that a foreign state cannot be sued
pursuant to the Flatow Amendment, it certainly raised the issue,
23 1
now rendering federal jurisdiction over such suits questionable.
Previously, many had thought that the uncertainties and
injustices inherent in the FSIA were due to the Clinton
Administration's brand of beguiling politics. 232 Those who had
blamed the Clinton Administration for the problems it created in
227

Roeder, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 172. (citing the "plain text" of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1605(a)(7)).
228

See, e.g., Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 184 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C.

2002); Wagner v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 128 (D.D.C. 2001);
Daliberti v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 146 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2000); Flatow
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 1998) (all issuing
judgments on behalf of plaintiffs).
229Roeder, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 173.
230 Id.
231 See Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82 (D.C.
Cir. 2002).
There is a question... whether the FSIA creates a federal cause of action.
.againstforeign states.... The "Flatow Amendment" confers a right of action..
.against an "official, employee, or agent of a foreign state,". . . but the
amendment does not list 'foreign states' among the parties against whom such
an action may be brought.
Id.
232at 87 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
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promulgating the FSIA's anti-terrorism amendments now must
turn their scrutiny to the Bush administration for having put its two
cents into the Act. The Roeder case demonstrates that neither the
change in administration, nor the events of 9/11 have changed the
political aspects of the FSIA. As the first critic of the most recent
amendments of the FSIA, the Roeder court said that the U.S.
legislative and executive branches "should not with one hand
express support for plaintiffs and with the other leave it to this
Court to play the role of the messenger of bad news." 233 In light of
the administrative steps taken over the past six years, it appears
that President Bush is acting out the same political charade
previously carried out by former President Bill Clinton.
Why did Bush even bother to sign the amended the Antiterrorism Act to allow the hostages to bring suit against Iran when
it was clear that the Algiers Accord prevented litigation on the
matter? If the answer is simply stated, "politics as usual," then it
seems that the American public has been kept in the dark about the
court battles between the U.S. and American victims of terrorism.
One would reasonably presume that widely publicized facts of the
U.S. government betraying its own citizenry would incite a public
outcry. The fact is, contemporary media coverage of the issue has
been conspicuously scant.
Likewise, at the time of enactment,
the Anti-terrorism Act went largely unnoticed by the American
public.235 Deemed the new "right to sue" provision, the legislation
was considered "a major landmark in protection of victims" of
foreign terrorism and predicted to "go down in history as one of
the crown jewels of the Anti-Terrorism legislation. ' 236 Yet, even
though it was asserted that the United States would "not rest easy
until every act of terrorism is stopped, ' 237 the country did not
233
234
235
236

Roeder, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 145.
But see Coyle, supra note 163.
See Baletsa, supra note 8, at 1250 n.12.
Allan Gerson, Holding TerroristStates Accountable, WASH.

TIMES,

June 4,

1996, at A15.
237

Baletsa, supra note 8, at 1275 n.265 (quoting a statement of Rep. Saxton,

144 CONG. REc. H1095 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1998); Vitrano, supra, note 25, at
214 n.5 ("We will not rest until we have brought them all to justice and secured
a future for our people, safe from the harm they would do. . . .") (quoting

President Clinton on signing the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996, Pub. Papers, Admin. of William J. Clinton (April 24, 1996)).
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appear all that restless. Popular media sources did address the new
anti-terrorism legislation to some extent. President Clinton
appeared on television to address the Cuban Air Force's shootdown of an American civilian aircraft, which was the subject of the
Alejandre238 case, and to request that Congress release frozen
239
Stephen Flatow 240
Cuban assets to compensate the victims.
appeared on 60 Minutes in 1998 to portray the personal story
behind the new legislation. 24 A year later, on CBS This Morning,
he appeared to expose the hypocrisy of the Clinton administration
in vigorously supporting the "Flatow Amendment" while later
242
opposing the attachment proceedings brought against Iran.
However, the landmark legislation received little attention in the
popular press overall. 243 Despite its importance, the Anti-terrorism
Act was "hardly heralded.",244 The same holds true today. It has
been suggested that the U.S. government is "quietly" opposing
American victims of terrorism. 245 In addition, it would seem that
the acts of the Bush administration in FSIA proceedings are even
more deserving of media attention. Undoubtedly, David Roeder,
the lead plaintiff in Roeder,246 would want to spread the word that
the U.S. government is "defending Iran, and against the backdrop
247
of our war on terrorism.,
Upon signing the Anti-terrorism Act in 1996, President
Clinton stated that "this bill strikes a mighty blow against
terrorism. ' 248 At the time of its imminent passing, President
238
239

Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
See Brothers to the Rescue, supra note 163 at Exhibit 1 (transcript of ABC

NEWS, February 26, 1996).
240 See supra text accompanying notes 88-92 (lead plaintiff and father of terror
victim, Alisa Flatow).
241 See 60 Minutes: In Memory ofAlisa, supra note 156.
242 See CBS This Morning, supra note 143.
243 See Allan Gerson, Holding TerroristStates Accountable, WASH. TiMEs, at
A15
(June 4, 1996).
244
id.

245

Pamela Falk, Suing Saddam: Victims of Terror Cannot Thaw Iraq's Frozen

Assets, N.Y.L.J., October 11, 2002, at 4 [hereinafter Suing Saddam].
246 Roeder v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 195 F. Supp. 2d 140 (D.D.C.
2002).
247 See Coyle, supra note 163.
248 Flatow v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 16, 20 (D.D.C.
1999) (citing President's Remarks on Signing the Anti-terrorism and Effective
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Clinton publicly espoused that the bill "stands up for victims in so
many important ways," concluding, "America will never abide
terrorists . .,249
Referring to the attacks on September 1 1 th,
President Bush said, "we will make no distinction between the
250
terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.,
Does the U.S. "harbor" terrorists by intervening on their behalf in
actions brought under the FSIA? If so, what exactly is the
"distinction" that President Bush is talking about? Political
rhetoric so often goes this way, in practical terms, always begging
the same question. Yet, whereas Clinton's noble fight in the war
on terrorism may have gone unchecked by the American majority,
Americans are now intently focused on Bush's actions in dealing
with terrorists. President Bush has also called for solidarity, for
Americans to "stand together" 251 in fighting terrorism; this must
embrace the idea that in a court battle of Us versus Them, We are
all on only one side of the conflict.
For injuries caused by the terrorist attack of September
1 1 th, the first FSIA lawsuit against the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan, the Taliban and Osama bin Laden was filed on
October 10, 2001.252 Perhaps more for matters of principle than
compensation, 253 these plaintiffs will likely seek hundreds 254
of
millions of dollars in compensatory and punitive damages.
Assuming that Afghanistan is someday designated as a state
sponsor of terrorism, the fact is, Afghanistan is not a wealthy
country. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that enough funds could
be discovered to satisfy judgments for thousands of potential
plaintiffs seeking civil justice for 9/11.255
Death Penalty Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRESS. Doc 717 (April 24,

1996)).

249 id.

50 Statement by the Presidentin Address to the Nation, supra note 186.

251 ld.

252 See
253

Falk, supra note 44.
The wife of a victim of the World Trade Center attack stated that her

lawsuit filed against Osama bin Laden, et al., was not to recover financially, but
to deprive the terrorists of their funds. "I will do whatever I can to bankrupt all

terrorists, those that harbor terrorists and those that help terrorists." 7 Families
Sue,
note 125.
254 supra
See Falk, supra note 44.
255 Fisk, supra note 65 (citing comment by Aaron S. Podhurst, plaintiff's
attorney inAlejandre, who won a $187 million judgment against Cuba in 1996).
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It is reasonable to assume that the Bush administration
would be more amenable than the former administration was to
allowing the release of frozen foreign assets, given the current state
of relations between the United States and certain Middle Eastern
states.25625But, so far, the political agenda remains unchanged.257
The Department of State is as resistant as ever and for the same
reasons.
According to The Department of State, contrary
legislation would "spark a race to the courthouse" as well as
"impair our ability to use blocked assets as diplomatic leverage
,,258

Iraq is another named defendant foreign state in FSIA
lawsuits seeking justice for the September 1 1 th terror attack.259 In
Hill v. Republic of Iraq,26 approximately twenty U.S. citizens,
who were taken hostage by Iraqi officials during the Gulf War and
used as human shields, sued Iraq and Saddam Hussein 261 under the
FSIA.26 2 The United States declined an invitation by the district
court to participate and express its interests in the pending
action. 263 In addition to being awarded several million dollars in
compensatory damages, the Hill plaintiffs were awarded $300
million in punitive damages against Saddam Hussein.2
Currently, the Hill plaintiffs are pursuing execution of their
256 See Falk,
257
251

supra note 44.

id.

Id. (quoting Paul V. Kelly, an assistant secretary for legislative affairs at the
Department of State in a letter to Rep. Chris Cannon, R-Utah, who has proposed

a new bill which would loosen the attachment provisions of the FSIA).
259 US Attacks-Related Lawsuit Targets Iraq, bin Laden, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, December 5, 2001, (Washington), available at http://www.lexis/
research/news (Judicial Watch chairman and General Counsel Larry Klayman
stated, "The evidence is overwhelming that Iraq was involved in the September

11 h, 2001 attack which murdered our client's wife.").
260 175 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2001).

Saddam Hussein is ostensibly the president of Iraq, but more realistically
believed to be the dictator of a one-party nation. Id. at 48 (citing the testimony
261

of former Ambassador Morris D. Busby). Busby was the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism of the U.S. Dep't. of State from 1988 to 1991. Id. at 39. For
all intents and purposes, Hussein is the "alter ego" of Iraq; for punitive liability

purposes, he was considered an "instrumentality" of Iraq by the court. Id. at 48.
2 Id. at 37-38.

263 Id. at38.
264 Id.at 48-49.
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judgments by attaching frozen Iraqi funds held in U.S. banks. 265
The Bush Administration has reportedly been obstructing the
execution of the judgments with vigorous opposition. 266 Further,
the Bush Administration, like the Clinton Administration before it,
has exhibited its disinclination to allow the release of frozen assets
in order to pay plaintiffs' judgments267for the same reasons: political
leverage and international integrity.
Another current development implicating the Bush
Administration surrounds a new provision entitled, "Justice for
Victims of Terrorism," recently added as part of a terrorism
insurance bill.268 Section 201 of Title II of the Terrorism Risk
Protection Act states its purpose as comprehensively dealing with
"the problem of enforcement of judgments rendered on behalf of
victims of terrorism.. .by enabling them to satisfy such judgments
through the blocked assets of terrorist parties." 269 This legislation
affects the presidential waiver provision of the Anti-Terrorism
Act.
Section 201(b) (1) addresses the presidential waiver
provision generally by requiring that "upon determining on an
asset-by-asset basis that a waiver is necessary in the national
security interest the President may waive the requirements of
subsection (a)," which subjects blocked assets of the foreign state
to execution or attachment. 271 This legislation could have a
dramatic impact on FSIA litigation if "necessary" is strictly
construed by the judiciary. Such an amendment might actually do
what the Anti-Terrorism Act was intended to do: compensate
American victims of terrorist acts and punish state sponsors of
terrorism.
The Bush Administration has been steadfast in its policy of
"preserv[ing] the prerogatives of the President in the area of
foreign affairs" at the expense of unsatisfied plaintiffs'

265

See Suing Saddam, supranote 245.

266 id.

267 id.

Treatment of Terrorist Assets, Pub. L. No. 107-297, Title II § 201, 116 Stat.
2337 (November 26, 2002).
268

269

id.

270 See id. § 201
271 Id. § 201 (a),

(b).
(b) (emphasis added).
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judgments.272 The Congress, on the other hand, continues to
reconstruct the Anti-Terrorism Act so as to facilitate its intended
purpose of using terrorist assets to compensate American victims
of terrorism. In fact, two U.S. senators had threatened to block the
entire terrorism insurance bill if the "Justice for Victims of
Terrorism" provision was not passed.273 In response, Secretary of
State Colin Powell unsuccessfully took up opposition by
personally2 74calling Senate leaders, asking them to omit the
provision.
Even during the Clinton administration it was a stretch to
conceive of diplomatic relations taking precedence with nations
like Iran and Libya, with whom our relations were virtually nonexistent. One key distinction is that Clinton was able to
successfully avoid military action. Yet, President Bush still
confronts the same issues faced by Clinton in this context, namely,
balancing foreign policy interests with those of American victims.
Tensions between the United States and many Middle Eastern
nations are at an all-time high.275 One danger in pursuing these
suits, which was predicted both by the members of the legislature
and the attorneys for the U.S. government, has been realized; the
Iranian government has encouraged Iranian citizens to file suits
against the United States in retaliation for the FSIA lawsuits
brought here. 276 If and when relations with terrorist sponsoring
states ever do normalize, the economic bargaining chips held in

272

See Suing Saddam, supra note 245 (quoting President George W. Bush

upon signing Foreign Affairs Authorization Act, which will enable seven FSIA

plaintiffs to be eligible for compensation under the Victims Protection Act
(September 30, 2002)); see supra note 102.
2

See Suing Saddam, supra note 245. Senators Bob Smith (R-N.H.) and Tom

Harkin (D-Iowa) argued in a letter to the Chairman of the Banking Committee
of the Senate that the provision "removes any ambiguity" about the AntiTerrorism Act. Id.
274

See id.

As this comment is about to go to publication, the United States is
preparing for a possible war with Iraq and is unsupported in this endeavor by its
NATO allies. See Steven R. Weisman, Threats And Responses: The Alliance;
275

Fallout From Iraq Rift: NATO May Feel a Strain, N.Y. TIMES, February 11,

2003, at A14.
276 See Vitrano, supra note 25, at 241 (stating that the encouragement came
in
the form of exempting Iranian plaintiffs attorney's fees from income taxes).
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frozen assets by the United States may be depleted by the
execution ofjudgments.
President Bush is about to find himself in a serious political
predicament. In a one trillion dollar law suit filed in a federal
court in Washington 277 on behalf of nearly 3,000 9/11 families,
there is speculation as to whether or not the Bush Administration
will have the audacity to impede the suit. 278 Several major Saudi
Arabian banks and charities and members of the Saudi royal family
are implicated in the FSIA suit.279 Because of escalating hostility
toward the United States in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia has
become a very important ally to our nation in recent days. 280 If
Bush lawyers attempt to have the case dismissed, the perception by
the American public of betrayal and hypocrisy by our government
could have grave political ramifications at home. "The most
frightening thing at this point is our own government," remarked
one of the plaintiffs in the recent FSIA case, whose son was
murdered by terrorists in the World Trade Center. 28 1 "We are
doing what Bush said to do. That they might try to get this case
dismissed... Ijust [can't] believe it."'282 If, on the other hand, Bush
demonstrates allegiance to the 3,000 9/11 victims and allows the
suit to continue against Saudi Arabian instrumentalities, critical
foreign relations could disintegrate. Whether President Bush will
break the political habit of legally opposing terrorist victims
remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION

The amendments to the FSIA have been justifiably
castigated for their failure to achieve the lofty goals of effectuating
domestic justice along with international crime-stopping. The
main goal of the Anti-Terrorism Act, to hold state sponsors of
terrorism accountable to compensate American victims, has thus
277

See Coyle, supra note 135 (citing Bumett v. Al Baraka Investment & Dev.

Corp., No. 02-1616).
278 See id.
2 79

id.

280 id.
281
282

Id. (quoting Liz Alderman, who sits on the lawsuit's client committee).
Coyle, supra note 135 (quoting Alderman).
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far failed.283 Yet, there may be no better time in history for
political influences to play a most welcomed role in the judicial
process to redeem the tainted reputation of the FSIA.
Given the current American perspective, decidedly forever
changed by the events of September 1 1 th, it is confounding to
reconcile the notion of any U.S. action either opposing an
American plaintiffrs quest for justice against terrorists or acting on
behalf of terrorists in protecting their assets. In Wagner v. Islamic
Republic ofIran, the court made reference to 9/11 in stating, "Now
more than ever, this Court believes that the acts of terrorists and
their sponsors must be punished to the full extent to which civil
damages awards might operate to suppress such activities in the
future., 284 It is not enough that the "courage and steadfastness" of
the victims of terrorism pursuing litigation against terrorists and
their efforts to "deter more tragic deaths and suffering of innocent
Americans at 285
the hands of those terrorists, are to be commended
and admired.,
It is clear that the victims have done their part and that the
courts have tried to do theirs. The legislature or the executive must
act in order to obtain effective results under the FSIA because, as it
stands, "There is the utter absence of any coherent policy" by the
federal government. 2 86 Perhaps it is true that Congress failed to
anticipate such resistance from the executive branch or to predict
the judiciary's narrow construction of the FSIA exceptions to
immunity. 287 Sadly, in the years following the passage of the AntiTerrorism Act, the grim truth remains that "terrorism is here to
stay." 288 Short of enacting further amendments to the statute,
eliminating the legal blockades faced by FSIA plaintiffs, the task is
now left to the executive branch to do the right thing, to stand up
for American victims as it has so often publicly declared that it
would. After having been attacked by terrorists, victims are now
forced to fight their final legal adversary: the President of the
283

See Vitrano, supra note 25, at 242 (arguing that the recent amendments to

the FSIA did "little more than respond to Congress' political need to placate the

plaintiffs by paying them off').
284 172 F. Supp. 2d 128, 138 (D.D.C. 2001).
285 Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2000).
286 Coyle, supra note 135 (quoting international litigator, Allan Mendelsohn).
287 See Vitrano, supra note 25, at 222.
288 Coyle, supra note 135 (quoting international litigator, Allan Mendelsohn).
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United States. The Clinton Congress might never have imagined
the potential ramifications of the Anti-Terrorism Act in today's
terror-ridden America.' However, President Bush has been
thoroughly briefed. Since President Bush has already picked up
where his predecessor left off regarding FSIA suits, it is fairly
certain that in the balance between foreign relations and domestic
justice, the scales will remain dramatically tipped in disfavor of
American plaintiffs.
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